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Chapter Three

Politics and Philosophy in Aristotle's
Critique of Plato's Laws
KEVIN

M. CHERRY

·ci<.

Whether on matters of politics or physics, Aristotle's criticism of his predecessors is not generally considered a model of charitable interpretation.
He seems to prefer, as Christopher Rowe puts it, "polemic over accuracy"
(2003, 90). His criticism of the Laws is particularly puzzling: It is much
shorter than his discussion of the Republic and raises primarily technical
objections of questionable validity. Indeed, some well-known commentators have concluded the criticisms, as we have them in the Politics, were
made of an earlier draft of the Lt~ws and that Plato, in light of these criticisms, revised the final version. 1 I hope to suggest, however, that these
incongruities should lead us to look beyond Aristotle's explicit criticisms
to an issue he also omits while discussing the Republic, namely, the character of philosophy and its place in political life.
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Before turning to examine the Laws itself, Aristotle makes a curious
remark, often read as stating that Socrates is the principal philosopher of
2

the Laws. Discussing the differences between the Republic and the Laws,
Aristotle says that "all the speeches of Socrates [nuvn~ ol -rou L:oKpu-rov~
Aoyot] are extraordinary; they are sophisticated, original, and searching

[To ~YJTYjTtK6v]. But it is perhaps difficult to do everything finely" (Politics
1265a10-13). 3
By referring to "all" the Socratic speeches, Aristotle is obviously including more than one dialogue, and it is perhaps tempting to assume that
he intends to include the Laws. Yet Aristotle never states that the Athenian
Stranger is Socrates or that Socrates appears in the Laws. Indeed, given
the context, Aristotle may well be contrasting Socrates and the Athenian.
For what he finds most praiseworthy about the Socratic dialogues-their
searching, or zetetic, character-seems to be wholly absent from the
Laws. Sinclair and Saunders thus wonder whether Aristotle's reference is
"an ironic joke, the ponderous lecturing being a poor replacement for the
scintillating conversation of Socrates" (in Aristotle 1992, 120).
What Aristotle suggests here is that there is a difference between
Socrates and the Athenian, a difference that is as philosophic as it is political." While Aristotle's explicit account focuses on the political institutions proposed by the Athenian, these criticisms bring us around to the
philosophic dispute. That is, we must consider how zetetic the Athenian
Stranger is.

THE MIXED REGIME
Aristotle is quite clear that neither the Republic nor the Laws offers proper
guidance for political life, yet his Politics has far more in common with
the institutions prescribed by the Athenian Stranger. This should not be
surprising, for both emphasize learning from the successes, and more
frequently failures, of other cities (e.g., Laws 691b-92c, 722b, 892de,
968b; Politics V-VI). Unlike Plato's Socrates, the Athenian claims to have
traveled extensively and engaged in the study of existing constitutions
recommended by Aristotle at the conclusion of the Nicornachean Ethics
(118la10 ff.), and he recommends that the rulers of the city do the same
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and incorporate their own experiences into law (639d-e, 772b, 846c,
95lbc, 957b). 5
Perhaps as a result of this shared reliance on political experience,
both the Athenian Stranger and Aristotle recommend a mixed, or moderate, regime. 6 There are, however, significant differences in how each
understands such a mixture. Given the pious character of the Laws, it
is unsurprising that the Athenian divinizes the argument for the mixed
regime. 7 He ascribes the development of the mixed regime in Sparta to
a god (691d-92c, 691d8) and relies on a myth about the age of Kronos
8
to justify the rule of law (713c ff.). A god facilitated the development of
a mixed regime in Sparta, allowing her to avoid the evils that befell her
fellow cities, and the Athenian suggests that we need only learn from the
god's work (692b-c). 9 In the age ofKronos gods cared for human beings,
and so we should recognize that in the absence of a god we must subordinate our rulers to laws, the closest thing to the divine we have (714a).
For the Athenian Stranger, the conflict between the various kinds of
rule is ultimately irreconcilable. 10 He identifies seven different claims to
rule: that of parents over children, the well born over the not well born,
the elder over the younger, masters over slaves, the strong over the weak
(which elicits an enthusiastic affirmation from the Cretan Clinias, cf.
625b-26c), the prudent over the ignorant (which the Athenian praises),
and that of the lucky or, more charitably, the dear to the gods (690a-d).
A lawgiver must somehow incorporate them all in order to avoid faction,
the great evil in cities (628a-c). In determining what regime would be
appropriate for their colony, the Athenian asks his Dorian counterparts
whether they live in monarchies, tyrannies, democracies, oligarchies, or
tyrannies. They are unable to answer, for they find elements of the different kinds of regimes-save oligarchy-within their own. The Athenian
is pleased, commenting that in most cities one part of the city enslaves
the others (712c-13a). Therefore, their laws exist to benefit only a part
of the city, and the city is divided into factions [crrctaLr..'rrYjc;]. Thanks to
the intervention of the god, laws in the cities of Clinias and Megillus
pursue "what is common to the whole city" (715b), and it is only cities
such as these that are worthy of the name "regime" (713a). Indeed, all
other cities-democracies, oligarchies, even monarchies-are, effectively, nonregimes [oil no'Arrdctc;] (832b10).n Aristotle concedes that the
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city described by the Athenian Stranger is indeed a polity, or regime
[rro'Amictv] (1265b26-28). 12
Aristotle alludes to this discussion in his own division of regimes in
Book III of the Politics. He initially distinguishes regimes on the basis
of whether they pursue the common or private good and the number of
rulers, referring to the regime in which the multitude rules for the sake
of the common benefit as the one that has "the name common to all
regimes" [To JCotvov OVOfi.ct nct<rwv Twv no'Amtwv], that is, polity [no'Amict]
(1279a38-39). This is an odd locution, of course, and has been the subject of much commentary, but in light of the Athenian's comment it
makes perfect sense. The "polity," as Aristotle's mixed regime is generally translated, is described by him as the rule of the multitude for the
common advantage. Due, however, to the limitations of the multitudemost citizens are incapable of possessing the fullness of virtue-the polity achieves the common advantage only by incorporating the wealthy
and virtuous alongside the multitude. Insofar as the polity attempts to
secure the genuinely common advantage rather than the advantage of the
many poor or few rich it meets the condition the Athenian sets out for
being appropriately called a "regime." It is the regime that is, and should
be, called regime. From Aristotle's perspective, it is the regime that most
fully instantiates the character of political communities as communities
of free and equal, though different, citizens, who alternate ruling and
being ruled.
Aristotle argues for the mixed regime on the basis of opinions about
political equality advanced by oligarchs and democrats; ignoring either
opinion would be not only destabilizing but also unjust (1280a9 ff.,
130la25 ff.). The virtuous contribute more to the city's higher, truest,
end-that of living well or nobly-and so they have a "greater part" in
ruling, but the wealthy and free do make contributions and so should
have some, if a lesser, part (128la2-8). While the Athenian emphasizes
the necessity of having checks on people in power and appeasing the
many who would not be satisfied with the rule of the virtuous, Aristotle's
case for the mixed regime is at least partially based on the positive contributions made by different groups to the polis (128la40 ff., 1283a24 ff.;
cf. 1309Bl6-19). By contrast, the Athenian's inclusion of democratic institutions such as the lot seems to be due only to the "necessity" fostered
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by the many's refusal to accept "strict justice" rather than any contribution they make (757de).
Aristotle agrees that reconciling the various claims to rule can be difficult, but he suggests the challenge is less formidable than the Athenian
Stranger proposes. Some of the claims belong not in the polis, according
to Aristotle, but rather the household, and others, he argues, are solved by
nature. Whereas the Athenian suggests that the various claims to rule are
"by nature opposed to one another," Aristotle instead asserts that nature
helps solve this problem by distinguishing the young from the old (Laws
690d2-3; Politics 1332b35 ff.). Young citizens, endowed with strength,
are well suited for military service, which enables them to acquire the
necessary experience of being ruled, as well as some familiarity with the
advantageous and just, before they become rulers (1329a2 ff.). Later in life
they will serve as priests, for it would be improper for anyone other than
citizens to honor the gods (1329a26 ff.). The tensions within the mixed
regime are less pronounced for Aristotle than for the Athenian Stranger.u

THE RULE OF NOUS AND THE NOCTURNAL COUNCIL
In order to avoid having one class ruling, the Athenian Stranger insists
that the city ought to be ruled by "whatever within us partakes of immortality, giving the name 'law' to the distribution ordained by intelligence" (714a). It is difficult to see how the various offices within the
city will reflect intelligence until the Athenian introduces the Nocturnal
Council in Books X and XII. The Council comprises many of the most
important officials in the city, and its ability to alter the laws (whether
explicitly or, more likely, through interpretation) means that its mem14
bers, in fact, rule. The rule of law may be the closest parallel to the rule
of nous, but nous comes to be in the laws only through the actions of the
Nocturnal Council. As the Athenian says, once in place the Council will
have the city turned over to it (969b).
To be sure, the presence of philosophy is muted in the Laws. The
word occurs only twice (857d2, 967c8). 15 1hat is, at least in part, because
the Athenian's interlocutors show little capacity for it. They do, however,
show a willingness to accept it in their polis: Clinias accepts transcending
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the laws in order to prove the existence of the gods, and the Athenian
indicates that "unfamiliar arguments" will be necessary (89ld-e)-the
very arguments to be studied by the Nocturnal Council (966e). This is
not to suggest that all the members of the Council will be philosophers.
Rather, it is to highlight the requirement that members of the Council
receive an advanced education in order to pursue philosophical questions
of a certain kind (818a), even if for practical purposes rather than the love
and acquisition of wisdom (968c ff.). 16 Most citizens, by contrast, will accept these teachings almost as if they were slaves, without being able to
explain them (966b, 967d-68a).
17
As in the Republic, philosophy thus comes to rule in the city. Both
Socrates and the Athenian Stranger claim that rulers must philosophize
if politics is to be successful (cf. Republic 473d) and that the city's institutions must provide a place for philosophizing. Indeed, from Aristotle's
perspective, the Athenian's reliance on philosophy is more problematic
than that of Socrates, insofar as the Athenian turns the city over to philosophy without saying so explicitly. Aristotle is skeptical of efforts to
deceive the people (1297a7-10). 18 However, I would suggest that Aristotle
also finds the content of the Athenian's philosophy more problematic
than that of Socrates.
As Catherine Zuckert has shown, the two investigations the Athenian
Stranger assigns to the Nocturnal Council are ultimately incompatible
(2009, 143-46). The first task described by the Athenian Stranger is to
come to understand the nature of virtue: How is it both one and fourthat is, how is there "virtue" bur also courage, moderation, justice, and
prudence (965d)? How does virtue relate to what is beautiful and good
(966a)? 1hese inquiries point, of course, to the Socratic investigations
recounted in Plato's dialogues, searching for the unchanging ideas. However, the Athenian also insists that the Nocturnal Council investigate
the motion of the heavenly bodies on which he based his theology in
Book X of the Laws. These bodies, as we shall see, are not only in constant motion-and thus not unchanging-but also are, at least in part,
in irregular motion. The Athenian's account points in both Socratic and
pre-Socratic directions and is ultimately incoherent. 19
Aristotle would doubt whether either of these inquiries is necessary
or useful for statesmen. His criticism of the form or idea of the Good in
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the Nicomachean Ethics (1096all ff.) suggests that a similar knowledge
of virtue, or the various forms it takes, might be equally unhelpful in
helping us become virtuous. In addition to his own catalog of virtues in
the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle praises Socrates' sparring partner Gorgias for enumerating the variety, rather than investigating the unity, of
the virtues (Politics 1260a24-28), particularly insofar as virtuous action
differs for each kind of person (1259b18 ff.). It is not that virtue is unimportant for political life but rather that making people virtuous might
not require philosophic knowledge of the virtues.
The more critical error for Aristotle, I think, is the Athenian's emphasis on cosmology as the basis for political order. It is clear throughout
the Laws that the Athenian's argument for the existence and providence
of the gods is central to his enterprise. While it is Clinias who states that
the proof of the gods' existence and providence would be the best and
noblest [x:ct/J.LO"TOV TE x:cd apLO"TOV] of the preludes (887cl-2; cf. 726a ff.,
907dl-2), the Athenian does not disagree-and given the emphasis on
piety throughout the dialogue, it is hard to see how he could. Aristotle,
however, suggests that such knowledge might be unnecessary for, if not
dangerous to, political life. In his treatment of the intellectual virtues
in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, he draws a careful yet firm distinction between the virtues of phronesis and sophia. The former involves
human action, that which can be otherwise, and it takes a variety of
forms, including acting for one's own end as well as legislating for a city
(1140al ff., 1141b23-34). Sophia, by contrast, is the most precise kind
of knowledge insofar as it is directed at the highest objects (I 141a9 ff.)
and seems to provide little guidance in the exercise of phronesis, which
may be why people with experience often make better choices than those
with wisdom. Popular views about the soul, for instance, are sufficient for
guiding legislators in their effort to guide citizens to virtue. The prospective legislator must know that humans possess both rational and irrational parts of the soul, in order to employ both parts in leading citizens to
virtue (NE 1102a18-26). He would not need to know what is argued in
the De Anima, in which Aristotle denies that the soul is divided or even
divisible (411b5 ff.; cf. NE 1102a30-31).
Moreover, to base a political community on these arguments about
the gods is to place politics on an unstable foundation, for Aristotle
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emphasizes that, due to their distance from us, our knowledge of the
heavenly bodies is, and must remain, uncertain. 20 The best that we can
do is offer arguments that are likely (e.g., De Caelo 286a3 ff., 291 b24 ff.).
The Athenian Stranger also acknowledges this, indicating that his argument will go only so far as human power is capable of knowing these
things (966c; cf. Timaeus 28c). Despite this, the Athenian proceeds as
though the truth about the soul and the gods can be grasped on the
basis of arguments that are not particularly difficult or lengthy (82Ie). By
contrast, Aristotle contends that "in every way the soul is one of the most
difficult things to get any assurance about" (De Anima 402all-12). 21

ORDER AND DISORDER IN NATURE AND POLITICS
The "unstable" foundation of a regime based on cosmology IS compounded by the way in which the Athenian's inquiry into gods and soul
reveals the universe to be at least partially disordered. The result of this is
not only, as I noted earlier, a belief that the various claims to rule cannot
be reconciled; it also implies a conception of nature that places human
beings in a world that is at the very least unconcerned with human flourishing, if not survival. 22
The argument about divine providence that fills most of Book X of
the Laws is primarily intended to show the existence and priority of soul
over body (892a-c). The Athenian discusses several kinds of motion, but
these seem to be reducible to two fundamental kinds: motion that is capable of moving others but not itself and motion capable of moving itself as
well as others (894b). 23 The latter motion is obviously eldest and strongest,
and such a motion must be characteristic of soul (894d-96a). Insofar as
this motion must be first, soul must be prior and superior to body (896c).
What is surprising is that the Athenian makes soul the cause of all the
motions-"good and bad, noble and shameful, just and unjust"-that we
see in the universe (896d). It is only when soul is joined with intelligence
(nous) that it produces what we usually call good, for example, happiness
and order, while it produces the opposite when it lacks intelligence (897b).
The Athenian Stranger asserts that insofar as there are souls that
possess every virtue, there must be gods, for what else could such souls
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be (899b)? 24 The argument continues to show that the gods display care
[brq.dAEta-v] about human affairs, both great and small, because the gods
could not lack any virtue, much less the knowledge necessary to order
things (900d). The Athenian himself acknowledges that their argument
is not entirely convincing and that some "mythic incantations" [en~6wv
... ~-tt!9wv ht ·rwwv] are also necessary to persuade those who doubt the
gods (903a-b; cf. 905d). However, while their myths assert that the gods
"contrived" the universe so that virtue would triumph over vice, the
Athenian compares the gods to doctors fighting disease or farmers faced
with crop shortages (905e-6a). Such conflicts arise because heaven is full
of both good and bad things, and, indeed, "there are more of the latter."
The result is a universe characterized by "an immortal battle" [ft&XYJ ...
a9ava-r6~] between good and evil (906a-b; cf. Statesman 273b-d). The
gods may try to care for us, but their success is uncertain. Myths, therefore, are precisely what is necessary to convince the atheists of the second and third, if not the first, truths about the gods-that they care for
human beings and cannot be bribed (903a-b). 25 The arguments offered
by the Athenian seem to be insufficient for this purpose. Aristotle would
not be surprised: The divine beings, or gods, must, according to his arguments, be uninterested in human life.
The philosophic view that the cosmos is characterized by disorderly
as well as orderly motion is evident throughout the Laws, and it has more
significance than being incompatible with the investigation into the being
of the various virtues. The Athenian, for instance, claims that "almost all
human affairs are matters of chance," due to the frequency of "accidents
of every sort," such as war, poverty, disease, or bad weather (709a-b). 26
The account of the origins of cities that he provides in Book III is equally
suggestive of "many disasters," such as floods and plagues, that befall and
periodically destroy almost all human beings (678e-79a). 27 1he Athenian's
account of the universe places human beings in a precarious position.
Rather than beginning from abstract, and problematic, speculations about the gods, Aristotle instead begins, and believes philosophy
should begin, with what is familiar to us and proceed from there (Physics
184a16-21). 28 Nature for Aristotle is not the product of a divine craftsman (cf. Laws 967b), although it is sufficiently analogous that Aristotle
frequently speaks of nature itself as a craftsman with respect to the way
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that it regularly achieves its ends (e.g., Physics 199a12 ff.). Nature is sufficiently consistent that it achieves its ends either always or for the most
part (Physics 199al). Like the Athenian, Aristotle recognizes that there
is disorder in the universe. Rather than posit a fundamental conflict between order and disorder, however, Aristotle suggests that the whole is,
by and large, orderly and thus intelligible.
Both the Athenian Stranger and Aristotle admit three possibilities
with respect to motion: Either all things are in motion, all things are at
rest, or some things are in motion and some at rest (Laws 893bc; Physics
253a23 ff., 254a15 ff.). Both accept the last alternative, but Aristotle indicates that this answer is inadequate. We also must learn whether those
things in motion are always in motion and those things at rest always
at rest, whether all things are capable of being in motion and at rest or
whether some things are always in motion, some things are always at rest
and others capable of rest as well as motion. Aristotle, of course, opts for
the last of these, and what is noteworthy in light of the Athenian's argument is Aristotle's effort to show that, in addition to things always in
motion, some things are always at rest (Physics 254b3 ff.).
For Aristotle, that which is always at rest is the unmoved, or prime,
mover. While the Athenian Stranger highlights soul as the first motion,
Aristotle argues instead that the presence of something always in motion is reflective of the fact that there is something that causes motion
without itself moving (Physics 257a27-32, 258b10-16; cf. Metaphysics
107lb3-6). 29 The unmoved mover moves other things not by moving
itself but by being an object of desire and thought (Metaphysics 1071 b20,
1072a26). In contrast to the views of the Athenian, this unmoved
mover-which Aristotle identifies as god-is intellect, or thought, that
thinks about only that which is "most divine and precious" without
changing (1074b26). It contemplates itself and has no providential or
creative purpose, nor does it possess the virtues (NE 1178b7 ff.).
In addition to arguing that motion depends on something that does.
not move, Aristotle doubts whether the soul can properly be said to move
at all, although it can effect change and thus cause motion in other beings (De Anima 408b30 ff.). The highest characteristic of souls, Aristotle
suggests, is the capacity to engage in thought (414b16-415a13) and thus
achieve a higher level of perfection insofar as it more closely resembles the
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activity of the unmoved, and unmoving, mover (Metaphysics 1072bl4 ff.).
It is not humans but those beings which cannot be otherwise than they
are, which exist unchanging and by necessity, that are by nature "most
honorable" (NE 1139bl8-24, 114lb3). We exercise our highest capacities
to their fullest in coming to know them. The stability of those beings
leads to stability throughout the universe. 30
In Book I of his Politics Aristotle begins with what is familiar and
obvious to both citizens and philosophers. He emphasizes not abstract
cosmological speculations but the orderly and hospitable character of
nature we encounter every day. The polis, he famously (though not uncontroversially) asserts, exists by nature (1252b30), and we are by nature
political animals (1253al-3). Indeed, he emphasizes that nature provides
human beings with the capacity for reason and speech (logos) that makes
political communities, to say nothing of human flourishing, possible
(1253a14-19; De Anima 414a29 ff.). Moreover, according to Aristotle,
what human beings need for their survival-such as food-is provided
by nature (1256b15-23). Aristotle seems to be suggesting that the regularity of nature, combined with the human ability to deliberate, enables us to
make use of what is found in nature for the sake of our self-preservation.
And at the end of the day, our ability to know these necessary and everlasting beings through wisdom, the most precise and the most honored
kind of knowledge, offers us the potential for the highest happiness (NE
114lal7-20, 1179b8 ff.). Having indicated that truths about the soul are
difficult, Aristotle, in his defense of the priority of the goods of the soul,
refers to his other arguments about happiness (Politics 1323a21-23).

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS
For all his disagreement with the Athenian Stranger-and Socrates-about
the nature and usefulness of philosophy, Aristotle only intimates such criticisms in his Politics. One reason may be that for Aristotle philosophy does
serve a purpose in politics, but it is a particular kind of philosophy: political philosophy, the study of what is just, what is equal, in the context of
the political (Politics 1282b20 ff.). This opens the door to philosophy in the
full sense, but it is not philosophy in the full sense. Nor does it need to be,
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for its truncated character means that more people can share in conversations about what is just and so share in the regime (1253al4-18). Political
philosophy need not be the exclusive preserve of a few.
This kind of philosophy is employed by Aristotle to resolve the conflict between the various claims to rule. Unlike those who would define
oligarchs and democrats only on the basis of their wealth or poverty and
would thus point, like the Athenian, to an irreconcilable division between
them, Aristotle suggests that a more philosophic understanding reveals
that these groups are truly distinguished on the basis of their opinions,
however partial or incomplete, about justice and equality (1279bll ff.).
Aristotle brings out in his Politics the numerous difficulties with trying
to eliminate class tensions. A turn to the doxai, however, enables Aristotle
to reconcile these political partisans by showing each group the partial
truth about their opinions as well as the partial truth about their opponents' opinions. An appreciation for the different contributions and
claims could easily be reflected in the political institutions of a mixed regime. Such a regime, which I take to be Aristotle's polity, would be more
than a Rawlsian modus vivendi; it would represent a shared and mutual
recognition of the contributions various groups make to the city. Only a
philosophic understanding of politics which defines the partisans within
the city on the basis of their opinion about justice enables those opinions
to be reconciled and ameliorates the conflict between them.
Insofar as Aristotle envisions philosophy playing a role in politics, he
is unwilling to criticize explicitly Socrates or the Athenian Stranger for
suggesting the same thing. Because he disagrees with the ways in which
they employ philosophy in the city, however, he criticizes the institutions
on which they rely to bring philosophy into the city and, more subtly,
the kind of philosophy that characterizes those institutions. For instance,
instead of examining the opinions about the various claims to rule in an
attempt to reconcile them, the Athenian turns to divine providence to
provide the necessary stability for the regime. The Athenian's arguments ·
for this are, however, exceptionally problematic: By making abstract
cosmological speculations that undermine the order of nature, he places
human life on shaky ground; by denying that there is anything stable and
unchanging, he makes impossible what Aristotle identifies as the highest
form of human activity.
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From Aristotle's perspective, any sound investigation into the heavenly bodies must be not only humble and tentative-and thus unsuited
as a foundation for politics-but also deeply rooted in the study of the
natural world around us (e.g., De Caelo 268al, 298b2-3). It is only after
investigating the physical world with which we are intimately familiar
that we can develop the basic framework-such as teleology-necessary
for trying to understand that which is far removed from our experience. 31
The Athenian's arguments proceed without any of this background. They
seem, therefore, to be less an attempt at seriously understanding the universe than an attempt to foster adherence to the laws he and his interlocutors have set down. They resemble, in short, "what modern thinkers call
'ideology,' that is, the use of philosophically derived concepts and arguments to support a specific political order" (Zuckert 2009, 143). While
Socrates and the Athenian both err by making politics dependent on
philosophy, Socratic philosophizing alone retains its zetetic character and
is thus worthy of praise.

NOTES
1. See, e.g., Morrow 1960.
2. Thomas Pangle claims "Aristotle (Politics 1265a12) identifies him as Socrates"
(in Plato 1988, 511). Like Pangle, Leo Strauss suggests that the Athenian Stranger
represents Socrates having fled his prison in Athens (1975, 2). Others suggest that the
Athenian Stranger represents Plato's own mature views (e.g., Halverson 1997).
3. Peter Simpson observes that while "Aristotle refrains from expressly naming
Socrates in this chapter about the Laws (instead he uses 'he' or 'in the Laws' or something similar) ... he names Socrates many times in his preceding discussion of the
Republic" (Simpson 1998, 93). In the same way, Aristotle never names-perhaps he
could never name-the Eleatic Stranger of Plato's Statesman (e.g., Politics 1252a6-16,
1289b5-6).
4. Aristotle later combines the views of Socrates and the Athenian Stranger
into those of Plato, arguing that Plato's originality consisted in "having in common
women and children as well as property; and further the law concerning drinking
... ; and also that aspect of military training which has them develop ambidexterity"
(1274b10 ff.).
5. Morrow (1993) argues that many of the Athenian Stranger's recommendations are variations of institutions found in Solonic Athens. Given Aristotle's praise,
however qualified, of Solon (1273b25 ff.), it is unsurprising that there is significant
overlap with the laws discussed by the Athenian.
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6. This is at least the case with regard to the best attainable regime. Aristotle's regime according to prayer in Books VII and VIII is an aristocracy insofar as it
represents the rule of the best, but it is an aristocracy that includes a multitude of.
rather than few, citizens. The Athenian Stranger acknowledges that he is legislating
for human beings rather than children of gods, but he does not indicate what kind
of regime such divine offspring would warrant, save for the community of women,
children, and property (739a-c).
7. The Athenian himself refers to their city as a "divine regime" [Seta~ noAmta~]
(965c).
8. Both the Athenian Stranger and Aristotle criticize and so correct the Spartan
regime. The Athenian incorporates more of the Spartan model, perhaps due to the
interlocutors with whom he is conversing and the colony he is helping to found in
speech if not deed. Aristotle notes that someone-though perhaps not he himselfcould object to the Athenian's claim that his mixture is the second-best regime, preferring instead the Spartan or another more aristocratic regime. Might Aristotle here
be referring to Socrates (Republic 545b ff.)?
9. The Athenian Stranger acknowledges that humans, too, played a part in the
Spartan mixture (691e2, 692a3), but he deemphasizes their role in his summary, ascribing it only to a god (692b6) and not mentioning Lycurgus.
10. Jaffa (1963) argues that the central theoretical difficulty confronted by Aristotle in the Politics-the incommensurability of the various claims to rule-is resolved by the mixed regime and its inclusion of the multitude, which serves "as the
formula for the commensuration of excellences different in kind" (113).
11. Aristotle is rarely so explicit; he generally considers the deviant regimes to be
"less regimes" and not nonregimes (1293b29). However, when discussing the mixture
of"tyranny" and democracy in the Laws, Aristotle suggests first that they may not be
regimes at all bur then only that they are the "worst" of regimes (1266a I ff.).
12. Curiously, Aristotle will later fault, among others, Plato for failing to include
polity in the enumeration of regimes (1293a42-b1). In the famous degeneration of
regimes in the Republic, polity is not mentioned.
13. One reason this may be so is that for Aristotle while the polis exists for the
sake of living well, it comes into existence for the sake of living, and so those who
contribute to that lower, yet still essential, end-through, for instance, military
service-ought to have some share in ruling, even if their contribution to living well
is negligible (1252b27-30). '!he Athenian, by contrast, argues that nothing should
take priority to the acquisition of virtue, not even the defense of the city (770d-e).
14. As is acknowledged by Simpson, who suggests that Aristotle's real reason for
disagreeing with the rule of philosophers is that he believes "virtue can be found in
the mass" (2003, 302). Lewis (1998b) persuasively argues that the Nocturnal Council
does not undermine the regime outlined in the preceding books but rather meets
some of its needs.
15. Cf. Strauss, who idt:ntif!cs "the most philosophic, the only philosophic, part
of the Laws" as the theology of Book X (1'J75, 12')).
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16. C£ Zuckert 2009, 138-39.
17. Contending that Plato altered his preferred political views after the disastrous
events of Syracuse (196-200), George Klosko insists that the Laws "more or less explicitly turns away from the ideal of the Republic." Its culmination in the rule of the
"sinister sounding" Nocturnal Council that "recalls the Guardians of the Republic"
thus requires explanation (Klosko 2006, 218, 236, 252), which Klosko suggests is due
to Plato's death before completing revisions to the text (2008). Against this, see Lewis
1998a, 1998b; Marquez 2011.
18. The Athenian recognizes that not all officeholders will be virtuous, which is
why the institutions of the audit and the scrutiny play such an important role.
19. Lewis suggests that the Nocturnal Council, far from simply accepting the
Athenian's argument, will instead pursue these questions as they best see fit (2009, 88).
20. C£ Strauss's criticism of Thomistic natural law as "practically inseparable"
from "natural theology" as well as the Bible (1953, 164).
21. Aristotle's account of the heavenly bodies in De Caelo says little about the soul
(the word ['fux~l occurs only three times, 284a27, 28, 32).
22. The tension between the human good and "the observed, intelligible characteristics of the universe" brought out by Plato in the Laws reflects the contemporary
feeling that we are "adrift in a fundamentally indifferent, if not hostile environment"
(Zuckert 2009, 145). Pangle, too, notes that the "problematic, if not disorderly, character of the relation between the human and the nonhuman ... places man much
more at the mercy of indifferent or alien forces" (1976, 1076). 1he contrast with Aristotle, as I suggest above, is apparent.
23. I follow Mayhew's commentary in reading the former of these as the genus
of which the previously enumerated motions (893b-94b) are species (Mayhew 2008,
117 ff.)
24. Benardete contends that the Athenian Stranger "asserts that souls with complete virtue are gods, but he never shows that such souls are, ... and he admits he does
not know how they are and are causes (899b4-8)" (2000, 299).
25. Pangle suggests that the Athenian's conception of a universe divided between
good and evil will make for rich mythology among the citizens of Magnesia (1976,
1076).
26. The Athenian here connects chance and the gods. On the account in Book X,
this would represent disorder and order, respectively (709bc). They are joined by a
third thing, art, which is "gender" bur seems to be necessary in times of disorder.
27. Such disasters reflect the disorder in the universe. By contrast, the relative
ease of procuring food suggests the order in the universe (678e-79a).
28. While Aristotle envisions priests in his city according to prayer, he says little
about their duties and provides no specific theological doctrines save those useful
to the city. Piety is not among the virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics. Cf. Politics
1328b11-13, 1335b12-16.
29. Aristotle explicitly criticizes the Athenian's account in the Metaphysics, asserting that Plato errs by claiming that all things are in motion without identifying
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the cause of this motion. Insofar as Plato conflates soul and the heavenly motions, he
cannot point to a first cause: That which moves itself is not truly first (1071 b31-72a3).
30. Bodnar and Pellegrin assert that Aristotle's account of the order found in the
cosmos depends on "the causal influence of immutable entities" (2009, 270).
31. See Leunissen 2010, chap. 6.
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